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A Half-Baked Law: How the Supreme Court’s 
Decision in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water 
Management District Misses a Key Ingredient 
to Fifth Amendment Protection 
Property owners received a welcome boost to private-property 
protection when the Supreme Court decided Koontz v. St. Johns 
River Water Management District.1 Although the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Koontz clarified parts of the “mess”2 and “muddle”3 
that is the current state of “exaction law,”4 there is still a key 
ingredient missing from Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
protection.5 In regard to exaction law, the Supreme Court has 
added Takings Clause protection in a piecemeal manner since its 
decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, which held 
that an exaction must have an “essential nexus” to the reason for 
requiring the developmental permit.6 The Court’s piece-by-piece 
clarification of exaction law continued in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 
which held that an exaction must also be “rough[ly] proportional[ 
]” to the harm caused by the new land use and the benefit obtained 
by the condition.7 Such action by the Court has led to an untenable 
 
 1.  133 S. Ct. 2586, 2588 (2013). See A Property Rights Victory; Government can’t use 
permitting to extort from landowners, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2013, 7:24 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142412788732368350457856767055947581
6; Douglas Halsey et al., Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District No. 11-1447, 
570 U.S. __ (2013), LEXOLOGY (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=921c30e2-e6ed-4827-8414-9740e986924e 
(describing the Koontz decision as a “significant win for property owners”).  
 2.  Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice and Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 
279 (1992). 
 3.  Carol M. Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 561, 561 (1984). 
 4.  The precise definition of what constitutes an “exaction” is still debated by courts 
and commentators alike. For the purposes of this Note, I will use the definition given by the 
Texas Supreme Court in Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Limited Partnership: “[A]ny 
requirement that a developer provide or do something as a condition to receiving municipal 
approval is an exaction.” 135 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Tex. 2004) (internal citation omitted). 
 5.  The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment reads, “nor shall private property be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.” U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 6.  483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).  
 7.  512 U.S. 374, 398 (1994) (Stevens, J., dissenting). For the purposes of this Note, I 
will refer to the tests from Nollan and Dolan collectively as “Nollan/Dolan.” 
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application of principles by the lower courts, much of which is 
contradictory.8 While the Koontz decision addresses large parts of 
the confusion regarding exaction law application,9 ultimately the 
Court continued its piece-by-piece interpretation by leaving a 
substantial and controversial issue regarding the “legislative” vs. 
“adjudicative” distinction10 untouched.11 This Note argues that the 
only way to pay proper deference to the Constitution is to apply 
the Nollan/Dolan test to all exactions, regardless of their origin or 
character,12 and the Court missed an opportunity to establish this 
standard in the Koontz decision.13 
 
 8.  Compare Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 1995) (“Certainly, a municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a takings 
challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle when expropriating its citizen’s 
property.”), with Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999–
1000 (Ariz. 1997) (declining to apply the Nollan/Dolan heightened scrutiny standard to “a 
generally applicable legislative decision,” in part because Dolan “involved a city’s adjudicative 
decision”) (emphasis omitted). 
 9.  Koontz clarified two aspects of exaction law: (1) “money” or “in-lieu-of fees” are 
subject to the heightened scrutiny of the Nollan/Dolan test, and (2) the Nollan/Dolan test 
should still be applied whether the exaction is based upon a “condition precedent” or a 
“condition subsequent.” Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2596, 
2599 (2013). 
 10.  See Inna Reznik, Note, The Distinction Between Legislative and Adjudicative 
Decisions in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 242, 251–57 (2000) (examining lower 
court cases considering the Nollan/Dolan standard for exactions “to show the confusion and 
inconsistency the Court created by invoking the [legislative/adjudicative] distinction”). 
 11.  The legislative/adjudicative distinction was arguably not properly before the Court 
in Koontz. However, given the Court’s ruling on “monetary exactions,” the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction was clearly implicated. Even if the Court could not have 
addressed the legislative/adjudicative distinction with binding authority, it could have, at the 
very least, given guidance and direction to the courts below with persuasive dicta.  
 12.  An argument can be made that the only way to truly give deference to the text of 
the Fifth Amendment would be to do away with exactions completely; however, if a 
development is going to cause negative externalities, the landowner or developer should bear 
the burden of that cost. In this way the exaction is not really “taken for public use”; rather, it 
ensures the proper party is bearing the burden of the development. The Nollan/Dolan test 
ensures the burden imposed through the exaction is not unduly harsh or unconstitutional. 
 13.  If a court decision deprives landowners and developers of property rights, is that a 
taking? The question remains unsettled as the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether 
“judicial takings” exist. See Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 
560 U.S. 702, 713–15 (2010). In a four-person plurality, Justice Scalia suggested courts could, 
by judicial decision, cause an actionable taking. Id. Because the existence of “judicial takings” 
is unclear (although it is likely that if a proper question came before the Supreme Court the 
existence of “judicial takings” would be found), it is likewise unclear which test, if any, the 
Court would apply to analyze the taking. A “judicial taking” would most likely be found 
outside of the developmental permit context because in the developmental permit context the 
question of whether there is an unconstitutional taking or not would rely heavily on what the 
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Currently, many lower courts try to draw a “bright line” 
between exactions that are based on legislative decisions and those 
that are based on adjudicative decisions. This distinction first arose 
when the Court decided Dolan,14 a major exaction case following 
Nollan. In Dolan, the Court added another layer of Takings Clause 
protection by holding that the demands of an exaction need to 
demonstrate “rough proportionality” to the expected harm caused 
by granting the developmental permit, in addition to the “essential 
nexus” standard already required under Nollan. The Dolan Court 
went on to justify this heightened scrutiny by characterizing the 
exaction at issue as an “adjudicative decision,” as opposed to a 
“legislative” act likely warranting judicial deference.15 While many 
courts and commentators have tried to follow this distinction, others 
have pointed out the inherently false premise it presents. Because 
“[m]ost [land use] decisions are made through a combination of 
legislative and adjudicative acts[,] a bright-line dichotomy is false,”16 
and therefore unworkable as a rational standard. 
Even if it were possible to draw a bright line between legislative 
and adjudicative decisions in the exaction law context, this proposed 
rule would miss the point. Nowhere in the text of the Fifth 
Amendment is there a distinction made between legislative and 
adjudicative takings.17 By applying the Nollan/Dolan test to all 
exactions the courts will have a clear standard to work from, thereby 
creating coherent guidance for governments, landowners, and 
developers to follow for permitting purposes. Also, by applying the 
Nollan/Dolan standard to all exactions the very real threat of 
 
permit condition or exaction is, and therefore the presiding court would most likely just apply 
the Nollan/Dolan test.  
 14.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
 15.  Part of the confusion regarding the application of the Dolan Court’s analysis is that 
it is often not taken in proper context with the rest of the sentence, and the Dolan Court did 
not completely clarify what it meant by the distinction. The sentence reads: “First, they 
involved essentially legislative determinations classifying entire areas of the city, whereas here the 
city made an adjudicative decision to condition petitioner’s application for a building permit on 
an individual parcel.” Id. at 385 (emphasis added). It is beyond dispute that governments 
have zoning powers that can restrict certain uses of land. But it is another question entirely 
when you consider allowing governments to take property, whether real property or money, in 
a way they never could under zoning law. The Dolan Court needed to clarify the latter point, 
rather than relying on the geographic specifications of the ordinance in question.  
 16.  Steven A. Haskins, Closing the Dolan Deal—Bridging the Legislative/Adjudicative 
Divide, 38 URB. LAW. 487, 501 (2006). 
 17.  See U.S. CONST. amend V.  
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government extortion will come under judicial review,18 thus 
safeguarding the requesting landowner or developer’s Fifth 
Amendment right.19 
Part I of this Note will focus on a history of the development of 
exaction law under the Supreme Court’s guidance. Part II will 
explore the current theories posited by the courts for the use of a 
legislative/adjudicative distinction and the divergent outcomes these 
theories create. Part III will focus on why the legislative/adjudicative 
distinctions posited by the courts fail. And Part IV will consider how 
eliminating the legislative/adjudicative distinction altogether, 
specifically after the Court’s ruling in Koontz, and utilizing the 
Nollan/Dolan test in all exaction contexts will provide a uniform 
standard for lower courts to develop exaction laws that more fully 
protect the constitutional right guaranteed under the Takings Clause 
of the Fifth Amendment. 
I. A HISTORY OF NOLLAN AND DOLAN: THE TWO-PART TEST EXPLAINED 
To fully comprehend the current state of exaction law, an 
understanding of how the law developed and where it derived is 
essential. Each section of this Part will detail an important aspect of 
the creation of exaction law and the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction: Section A will briefly discuss the development of 
“zoning” laws and why they are important to exaction analysis. 
Section B will analyze the similarities and differences between zoning 
and exactions. Section C will analyze the Court’s ruling in Nollan 
and the change that ruling made to exaction law. Section D will 
analyze Dolan and the further modifications the Court made to 
exaction law. And section E will describe the questions left open by 
Nollan and Dolan and how the Court addressed some of those 
concerns in Koontz. 
A. Zoning Authority: Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co. 
In the first major “zoning” case to reach the Supreme Court, the 
Court gave broad deference to the legislative branch and its ability to 
 
 18.  The possibility of government extortion was a strong concern for Justice Scalia in 
the Nollan decision. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 19.  The “unconstitutional conditions” doctrine is a tenet preventing the government 
from conditioning a person’s receipt of a government benefit upon the waiver of a 
constitutionally protected right. 
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regulate land use.20 In the opinion, the Court reviewed state court 
decisions to justify its holding that zoning was an acceptable use of 
the police powers to regulate land use. Quoting the Louisiana 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court wrote: 
If the municipal council deemed any of the reasons which have 
been suggested, or any other substantial reason, a sufficient reason 
for adopting the ordinance in question, it is not the province of the 
courts to take issue with the council. We have nothing to do with 
the question of the wisdom or good policy of municipal 
ordinances. If they are not satisfying to a majority of the citizens, 
their recourse is to the ballot—not the courts.21 
The constitutionality of zoning ordinances is not up for debate. 
Zoning ordinances are usually the result of a legislative act, and as 
such, are presumed to be valid by the courts.22 If local constituents 
are not happy with a zoning scheme, their redress is to be found at 
the ballot box, not the courthouse.23 However, there are glaring 
differences between zoning laws and developmental exactions. 
Zoning is wrought by the police power of the state, employed to 
protect health, safety, welfare, and morals.24 Through zoning, a 
municipality can set the rules by which neighbors know how to 
interact with one another, specifically in the land-use context, with a 
hope of reducing nuisance claims. For example, local governments 
use zoning “to regulate . . . the height, . . . and size of buildings and 
other structures, . . . the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, 
the density of population, the location and use of buildings, 
structures and land for trade, industry, residence, or other 
purposes.”25 Another important characteristic of zoning is that it is 
 
 20.  See Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 393–95 (1926). 
 21.  Id. at 393 (quoting State ex rel. Civello v. City of New Orleans, 97 So. 440, 
444 (La. 1923)). 
 22.  See Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is 
Neither Illegal Contract nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 384–85 (2004). 
 23.  However, there are other forms of zoning-redress in certain situations. One 
example is a landowner seeking judicial relief by proving that she is subject to a discriminatory 
zoning scheme. Also, zoning depriving the owner of “all economic viability” may be subject to 
the Takings Clause. However, this “occur[s] only in the most extraordinary of circumstances.” 
Mark W. Cordes, Takings Jurisprudence as Three-Tiered Review, 20 J. NAT. RESOURCES & 
ENVTL. L. 1, 30 (2006).  
 24.  ANDERSON’S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 1.14 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th 
ed. 1996).  
 25.  Jane C. Needleman, Note, Exactions: Exploring Exactly When Nollan and Dolan 
Should Be Triggered, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1563, 1571 n.55 (2006) (citation omitted).  
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typically a “generally applicable” ordinance, applying to any and all 
landowners within a certain district, even those who are already 
established,26 usually in the form of some type of restriction based on 
the classification of the land, as opposed to an ad-hoc determination 
either granting or denying discretionary benefits. 
Put simply, the burdens of zoning ordinances are to be shared by 
all, and the benefits, hopefully, are to be shared by all as well. 
Although zoning restrictions implicate the landowner’s ability to 
exercise complete dominion over their land, the local government 
should not be “gaining” anything for public use from zoning. 
Through zoning, nothing is “taken” in the Fifth Amendment 
understanding of the term from the landowner and given to the 
public for use. 
B. Exactions and Zoning: Peas in a Pod? 
Although legislatures wield great power through zoning 
ordinances, almost to the point of depriving land of all economic 
value,27 zoning ordinances can only go so far in accomplishing local 
governmental goals. There are many benefits a local government 
cannot gain through zoning. For example, municipalities and local 
governments cannot have a road repaired through zoning. Nor can 
they have a traffic light installed, acquire a public easement, or lay 
curb and gutter.28 
All of these benefits, however, can be acquired by a local 
government or permitting authority in the context of granting a land 
development permit. When a local government conditions the 
approval of the permit upon the bestowal of the benefit, the local 
government can impermissibly gain something it otherwise would 
have had to purchase. The condition that needs to be satisfied for 
the approval of the permit is known as an exaction. The precise 
definition of what constitutes an exaction is still debated,29 but put 
simply, it is any requirement that a developer provide or do 
something as a condition to receiving municipal approval, even if 
that condition is the payment of money in the form of an “impact 
 
 26.  See Green, supra note 22, at 386 (“[S]tandard zoning enabling acts require that 
zoning ordinances apply uniformly to all property within a district.”) (citation omitted). 
 27.  See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).  
 28.  See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1586.  
 29.  See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
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fee.”30 Because local governments and permitting authorities can 
condition the approval of development permits, they can also force 
developers to make a choice: either succumb to our demands or the 
demands of the local permitting authorities (which might be 
unconstitutional)31 or withdraw your request. 
On its face, this type of dilemma raises the “unconstitutional 
conditions” doctrine, which forbids the government from 
conditioning a person’s government benefit upon the waiver of a 
constitutionally protected right.32 In the exaction context, the benefit 
of a development permit is conditioned upon the landowner or 
developer giving up some form of private property for public use 
without just compensation, thereby implicating the Fifth 
Amendment’s Takings Clause. Takings Clause protection has been 
described by the Court to “bar Government from forcing some 
people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”33 
On the other hand, while landowners and developers should not 
be forced to bear public burdens alone, the same is true for the 
public. The public at large should not be forced to bear negative 
externalities caused by private development. Because of this tension, 
exaction cases are not easily decided on pure policy grounds. 
In Koontz, the Court addressed the tension found in exaction 
cases with two main points,34 each addressing one side of the public 
burdens versus private externalities dichotomy. First, developers are 
especially vulnerable to the type of coercion the unconstitutional 
conditions doctrine seeks to prevent.35 That is, “the government 
often has broad discretion to deny a permit that is worth far more 
 
 30.  An impact fee is when a local government or permitting authority conditions the 
grant of a development permit upon a monetary fee, instead of the acquisition of real property. 
See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (holding that 
“monetary exactions,” also termed “‘in lieu of’ fees,” “must satisfy the nexus and rough 
proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan”). For an example of a court analyzing the 
constitutionality of an impact fee see Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 
930 P.2d 993, 999 (Ariz. 1997) (holding an impact fee for water development did not come 
under Nollan/Dolan review, overruled in part by Koontz). 
 31.  Local permitting authorities may be authorized by the legislature to impose such 
demands or the demands may come from the legislature itself.  
 32.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 33.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). This phrase is known as the 
“Armstrong Principle.” 
 34.  See 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 35.  Id. 
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than [the] property it would like to take.”36 Because the developer 
often values the permit more than the exaction, the local 
government can obtain a benefit it otherwise would have had to 
purchase, for nothing.37 
Second, the Court was quick to point out that a “reality of the 
permitting process is that many proposed land uses threaten to 
impose costs on the public that dedications of property can offset.”38 
Negative externalities, or public costs, are a reality of property 
development, and the Court recognized this. Just as it is not fair for 
a developer to bear the burden of losing private property for public 
use, the public should not be forced to bear the burden of private 
development costs. Some examples of negative externalities include 
increased traffic congestion, increased pollution, or the loss of 
wetlands, as was the case in Koontz.39 In concluding this thought, the 
Koontz Court alluded to the decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler 
Realty Co., stating that “landowners internaliz[ing] the negative 
externalities of their conduct is a hallmark of responsible land-use 
policy, and we have long sustained such regulations against 
constitutional attack.”40 
The dichotomy of how to balance Takings Clause concerns 
and negative externalities existed long before Koontz. Through 
the years, the Court has looked for ways to accommodate both 
sides of the argument. Through the development of the 
Nollan/Dolan test, the Court has found a way to “enable 
permitting authorities to insist that applicants bear the full costs 
of their proposals while still forbidding the government from 
engaging in ‘out-and-out . . . extortion’ that would thwart the 
Fifth Amendment right to just compensation.”41 
 
 36.  Id.  
 37.  Justice Scalia’s opinion in Nollan emphatically warns against this type of 
government “extortion.” See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).  
 38.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2595.  
 39.  Id. at 2592. Other negative externalities include speedier deterioration of 
infrastructure from increased use, loss of water from increased consumption, and loss of 
visibility, as was the case in Nollan.  
 40.  Id. at 2595 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)). 
 41.  Id. (citation omitted). 
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C. The Appetizer: Nollan v. California Coastal Commission 
In Nollan, the Court held that, when the government conditions 
the approval of a development permit upon the dedication of a 
public access easement, the exaction amounts to an unconstitutional 
taking unless there is an “essential nexus” between the government’s 
interest in the easement and the reason for requesting the permit.42 
The Nollans owned beachfront property in California and wanted to 
build a bigger house on their lot.43 Accordingly, they applied to the 
California Coastal Commission (“CA Commission”) for a building 
permit.44 The CA Commission agreed to grant the permit, on the 
condition that the Nollans dedicate a portion of their land as a public 
easement, so the public could more readily access the parks and 
beaches that bordered the Nollans’ property.45 The Nollans appealed 
the condition, but the CA Commission found “that the new house 
would increase blockage of the view of the ocean,” resulting in a 
“psychological barrier” to the public’s beach access.46 The CA 
Commission also found the exaction “would . . . increase private use 
of the shorefront,”47 thereby justifying the condition. The Nollans 
eventually appealed the decision all the way to the Supreme Court.48 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court sided with the Nollans, holding that 
the demand for a public easement across the Nollans’ land was 
unconstitutional. In an opinion delivered by Justice Scalia, the Court 
identified some of the main concerns exactions create: 
Had California simply required the Nollans to make an easement 
across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis 
in order to increase public access to the beach, rather than 
conditioning their permit to rebuild their house on their agreeing 
to do so, we have no doubt there would have been a taking.49 
While the Nollan Court recognized the CA Commission’s 
condition would have “no doubt” constituted a taking if it had 
 
 42.  The term “essential nexus,” regarding exaction and takings law, was first introduced 
in Nollan. 483 U.S. at 837.  
 43.  Id. at 828.  
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. at 828–29.  
 46.  Id. at 828, 835. 
 47.  Id. at 829.  
 48.  Id. at 825.  
 49.  Id. at 831.  
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simply been an order to the Nollans to create an easement,50 the CA 
Commission argued the permit condition was based upon legitimate 
police powers and therefore should not be found as a taking.51 The 
Nollan Court recognized the CA Commission may have had 
legitimate concerns regarding the public’s visual access to the beach, 
but the Court ultimately concluded that requiring an easement 
across the Nollans’ land would not resolve the viewing problem.52 
Rather, the CA Commission would have gained an easement without 
paying just compensation for the land. Had the CA Commission’s 
requirement actually remedied the stated public cost associated with 
the Nollans’ new house—i.e., not being able to view the beach—the 
Court would likely have found the “essential nexus” between the 
exaction and the development permit satisfied.53 
D. The Entrée: Dolan v. City of Tigard 
Seven years after the Supreme Court’s essential nexus framework 
was explained in Nollan, the Court clarified how far an “essential 
nexus” could extend. In Dolan, the Court stated that its purpose in 
granting certiorari was “to resolve a question left open by our 
decision in Nollan,”54 specifically “what is the required degree of 
connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the 
projected impacts of the proposed development”?55 
In Dolan, the Court determined that if an exaction is found to 
have the essential nexus required under Nollan, that same exaction 
must also demonstrate “rough proportionality” to the expected 
development’s “projected impact.”56 This determination requires the 
government to “make some sort of individualized determination that 
the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the 
impact of the proposed development.”57 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. at 837.  
 52.  Id. at 838.  
 53.  Id. at 835–42. 
 54.  Dolan v. City of Tiguard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994).  
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. at 388.  
 57.  Id. at 391 (footnote omitted). While making this determination, “[n]o precise 
mathematical calculation is required.” Id. at 395. The standard implemented in Dolan is a 
“quantitative” approach, whereas the standard under Nollan is more of a “qualitative” approach.  
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Florence Dolan owned a plumbing and electrical supply store 
and the land it stood on in Tigard, Oregon.58 A creek ran across the 
southwest corner of Dolan’s land, and, in its “comprehensive plan,” 
the city of Tigard had previously determined a flood risk existed 
along the creek.59 As such, the city recommended in the 
comprehensive plan that the area around the creek remain preserved 
as greenways and free from structures.60 Dolan desired to redevelop 
her site with a bigger store and parking lot. Accordingly, she applied 
for a development permit from the City Planning Commission.61 The 
commission conditioned the approval of her permit upon the 
requirements in the Community Development Code,62 thereby 
requiring the dedication of two portions of her land to the city as a 
public access pedestrian/bicycle pathway. One portion fell within the 
floodplain, and the other was a fifteen-foot strip adjacent to the 
floodplain.63 Dolan, not wanting to give up her property in exchange 
for a development permit, fought the commission’s ruling all the 
way to the Supreme Court. 
The Court held that even though the essential nexus required by 
Nollan was met, the exaction requirements were still too 
burdensome, and therefore unconstitutional as a taking.64 In the 
majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that an exaction 
could still create an unconstitutional condition even if the essential 
nexus was satisfied.65 According to the Chief Justice, there was no 
reason why the greenway or pedestrian pathway needed to be public 
instead of private.66 The Dolan Court held the exaction requirements 
did not demonstrate “rough proportionality” to the state interest at 
hand,67 and by so holding, the Dolan opinion added a quantitative 
approach to an already qualitative test. 
 
 58.  Id. at 379.  
 59.  Id. at 377–80.  
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id.  
 62.  Id. at 379–80. The Community Development Code is considered a legislative document.  
 63.  Id. at 380.  
 64.  Id. at 394–95.  
 65.  See id. at 393–95 (“The city has never said why a public greenway, as opposed to a 
private one, was required in the interest of flood control.”).  
 66.  Id. at 393.  
 67.  Id. Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that: “It is difficult to see why recreational 
visitors trampling along petitioner’s floodplain easement are sufficiently related to the city’s 
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E. An Unsatisfying Dessert: Questions Left Open after Nollan and Dolan 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Nollan and Dolan greatly 
enhanced landowners’ rights in battling unconstitutional exactions. 
In no small part, the Court has set up the equivalent of a rebuttable 
presumption favoring the landowner and requiring the permitting 
authority—government or otherwise—to show the exaction has an 
“essential nexus” to a state interest, and the exaction demonstrates 
“rough proportionality” to the expected cost.68 The rough 
proportionality of the exaction must be based on an “individualized 
determination” made by the government that is specific to the 
development and public costs involved.69 However, even with the 
Nollan/Dolan test in place, the possibility of government extortion 
in exaction law is still a problem, specifically because lower courts 
disagree on when to apply the Nollan/Dolan test. 
After Nollan and Dolan, there emerged three main areas of 
concern regarding exaction law and government extortion, and the 
lowers courts are split on how to handle them:70 (1) whether asking 
for money instead of real property constitutes a taking;71 (2) whether 
it matters if the exaction is proposed as a condition precedent or 
condition subsequent;72 and (3) whether it matters if the exaction is 
imposed by a legislative or an adjudicative body.73 
The first two concerns were recently addressed by the Court in 
Koontz.74 In Koontz, landowner and developer Coy Koontz, Sr., 
 
legitimate interest in reducing flooding problems along Fanno Creek, and the city has not 
attempted to make any individualized determination to support this part of its request.” Id.  
 68.  See supra Part II.C–D. 
 69.  Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391.  
 70.  See Haskins, supra note 16, at 490; Needleman, supra note 25, at 1565. 
 71.  This also includes such terms as “in lieu of fees,” “impact fees,” or “monetary 
exactions.” See Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 999 
(Ariz. 1997) (holding an impact fee for water development did not come under Nollan/Dolan 
review); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 689 n.1 (Colo. 2001) 
(considering whether a development fee for “triplexes” should come under Nollan/Dolan 
review); Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 625 (Tex. 
2004) (finding a development fee should come under Nollan/Dolan review).  
 72.  See St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 1223 (Fla. 
2011) (holding an exaction could not be found when the condition is imposed as a condition 
precedent), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2586 (2013).  
 73.  See Reznik, supra note 10, at 255.  
 74.  While there were other exaction-type cases to come before the Supreme Court—see 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); San Remo Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. City & 
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sought a permit to develop 3.7 acres on the northern part of his 
14.9-acre property.75 Although the northern portion of the property 
is isolated from the southern portion by a drainage ditch and power 
lines, the northern portion of the property drains well, and other 
constructions are nearby, almost the entire property is designated by 
Florida as wetlands. Because of the wetlands designation, Koontz 
offered to mitigate the damage his development would create by 
“foreclos[ing] any possible future development of the approximately 
11-acre southern section of his land by deeding to the District a 
conservation easement on that portion of his property.”76 
The St. John’s River Water Management District (“District”) 
found the proposed 11-acre easement inadequate.77 Instead, the 
District proposed Koontz pick between two exactions to obtain the 
development permit:78 he could reduce the size of his development 
to one acre and deed the remaining 13.9 acres to the District as a 
conservation easement; or, he could build on the 3.7 acres, as he 
originally desired, if he also agreed to make improvements to 
District-owned land several miles away.79 The improvements the 
District sought would have “enhanced approximately 50 acres of 
District-owned wetlands.”80 Rejecting both options, Koontz filed 
suit in state court under a Florida statute.81 
After a two-day bench trial, the Florida Circuit Court found the 
District’s proposed conditions were unlawful under the decisions in 
Nollan and Dolan.82 The Florida Supreme Court, however, reversed 
on two grounds.83 First, the Florida Supreme Court distinguished 
the Koontz case from Nollan and Dolan because “the District did 
not approve petitioner’s application on the condition that he accede 
 
Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002)—Koontz was the first time the Supreme Court issued a 
holding addressing head-on some of the questions surrounding exaction law.  
 75.  Koontz owned a 14.9-acre tract of land on the south side of Florida State Road 50, 
a four lane highway east of Orlando. The property is less than 1,000 feet from a tolled 
expressway and main thoroughfare of Orlando. Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 
133 S. Ct. 2586, 2591–92 (2013). 
 76.  Id. at 2592–93. 
 77.  Id. at 2593. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id.  
 80.  Id.  
 81.  Id.  
 82.  Id. The Florida District Court (the appeals court) affirmed the Circuit Court’s decision.  
 83.  Id. at 2593–94.  
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to the District’s demands; instead, the District denied his application 
because he refused to make concessions.”84 The U.S. Supreme Court 
took issue with this ruling, stating “[t]he principles that undergird 
our decisions in Nollan and Dolan do not change depending on 
whether the government approves a permit on the condition that the 
applicant turn over property or denies a permit because the applicant 
refuses to do so.”85 A holding otherwise would allow government to 
skirt any Nollan/Dolan review by simply phrasing the demands as a 
condition precedent to approval. 
The second distinction made by the Florida Supreme Court was 
that Nollan and Dolan were based upon a demand for interest in real 
property, whereas in Koontz the property owner was only asked to 
forfeit money.86 As with the condition precedent versus condition 
subsequent distinction noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court 
rejected the real property versus money distinction as well. The 
Court determined that under this reasoning, governments and 
permitting authorities could evade Nollan/Dolan review “simply 
[by] giv[ing] the owner a choice of either surrendering an easement 
or making a payment equal to the easement’s value.”87 In practical 
terms this is no choice at all; the cost to the landowner or developer 
is the same either way. It was pivotal to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
analysis that the demand for money was predicated upon “‘an 
identified property’” interest.88 There was a “direct link” between 
the demand for money and a specific piece of property, thereby 
“implicat[ing] the central concern of Nollan and Dolan”—
governmental extortion.89 
While the two main holdings in Koontz will certainly help clarify 
exaction law and guide courts in the right direction, the Supreme 
 
 84.  Id. at 2953 (citing St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Koontz, 77 So. 3d 1220, 
1230 (Fla. 2011)). This is a prime example of a court making a distinction between a 
“condition precedent” and a “condition subsequent.”  
 85.  Id. at 2595 (emphasis omitted). This type of power could obviously lead to extreme 
forms of government extortion, including “take it or leave it” demands.  
 86.  Id. at 2594 (“The majority [referring to the Florida Supreme Court] acknowledged 
a division of authority over whether a demand for money can give rise to a claim under Nollan 
and Dolan, and sided with those courts that have said it cannot.”).  
 87.  Id. at 2599. This is an example of an “in lieu of” fee.  
 88.  Id. (citation omitted). 
 89.  Id. at 2600. The dissent worried that this holding would impact a government’s 
ability to tax. But in Koontz, the monetary exaction at issue was not a tax and could not be 
considered a tax because the permitting authority had no power to tax. Id. at 2601. Taxing is 
further discussed infra in Part IV of this Note.  
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Court missed an opportunity to clarify the exact scope of its 
“monetary exactions” holding, and ultimately exaction law overall. 
By stating nothing about the legislative/adjudicative distinction, 
even though it is usually implicated when considering monetary 
exactions, the Court left lower courts to wonder about when to 
apply the monetary exactions holding. Whether Nollan/Dolan 
applies to monetary exactions derived from legislative decisions, as 
well as adjudicative ones, is still anyone’s guess. As Justice Kagan 
noted in her dissent, “The majority might . . . approve the rule . . . 
that Nollan and Dolan apply only to permitting fees that are 
imposed ad hoc, and not to fees that are generally applicable. . . . 
[T]hen again, maybe not.”90 Because the majority “refus[ed] ‘to say 
more’ about the scope of its new rule[,]91 [its new rule] now casts a 
cloud on every decision by every local government to require a 
person seeking a permit to pay or spend money.”92 Justice Kagan is 
right; because the majority opinion does not address what is often 
the dispositive issue in an exaction case—the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction—lower courts are still on their own to determine if and 
when the Nollan/Dolan test should apply. 
In most instances, the legislative/adjudicative distinction 
surfaces under the analysis of whether “impact fees” (monetary 
exactions) are based on a legislative or adjudicative decision.93 
With the Court now recognizing that “monetary exactions” are 
to be scrutinized under Nollan/Dolan review,94 it makes little 
sense to keep the legislative/adjudicative distinction around in 
any other aspect of exaction law, precisely because monetary 
exactions are always tied to some form of real property. Monetary 
or not, the core of an exaction is real property, which is 
specifically protected under the Fifth Amendment. 
The next logical step in takings law is to do away with the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction altogether. The Court should 
 
 90.  Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 91.  The dissent is referring specifically to the majority’s application of the 
Nollan/Dolan test to monetary exactions, which the dissent argued will affect local 
government’s ability to tax. 
 92.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
 93.  See, e.g., Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993 
(Ariz. 1997); San Remo Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87 (Cal. 2002); 
Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996); Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation 
Dist., 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001). 
 94.  See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2599.  
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have stated in Koontz that all exactions, regardless of their origin or 
character, are subject to Fifth Amendment Takings Clause 
protection, and therefore Nollan/Dolan review. 
II. CURRENT THEORIES POSITED BY COURTS REGARDING THE 
LEGISLATIVE/ADJUDICATIVE DISTINCTION 
The legislative/adjudicative distinction has proved very difficult 
for lower courts to apply consistently.95 Complicating matters further, 
some courts do not attempt to apply the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction at all; rather, they favor using the Nollan/Dolan test 
despite the legislative deference argument.96 To say that the split 
among lower courts has produced divergent results would be an 
understatement. While the lower courts have given many reasons for 
following or not following the legislative/adjudicative distinction, the 
most common approaches can be grouped into two main categories: 
“formal” and “functional.”97 
A. A Formal Approach to Exaction Law 
Courts adopting the formal approach to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction take the distinction at “face 
value,”98 denying Nollan/Dolan review to legislative exactions.99 
These courts give great weight to the “source” of the exaction,100 
showing deference to the legislature.101 This section will consider the 
three general reasons courts give for following the formal approach: 
(1) the knowledge of the legislature regarding specific topics, (2) the 
 
 95.  See Christopher T. Goodin, Comment, Dolan v. City of Tigard and the Distinction 
Between Administrative and Legislative Exactions: “A Distinction Without a Constitutional 
Difference,” 28 U. HAW. L. REV. 139, 148–57 (2005) (reviewing the varied approaches to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction employed by courts); Reznik, supra note 10, at 251.  
 96.  See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas Cnty., 887 P.2d 360 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Town of 
Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004). 
 97.  Matthew Baker, Comment, Much Ado About Nollan/Dolan: The Comparative 
Nature of the Legislative-Adjudicative Distinction in Exactions, 42 URB. LAW., no. 1, 2010 at 
171, 178–80.  
 98.  Id. at 178. 
 99.  See Reznik, supra note 10, at 256.  
 100.  Baker, supra note 97, at 179.  
 101.  This approach has been adopted by the majority of jurisdictions. D.S. Pensley, 
Note, Real Cities, Ideal Cities: Proposing a Test of Intrinsic Fairness for Contested Development 
Exactions, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 699, 707 (2006). 
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general applicability of legislative decisions, and (3) the 
accountability of the legislature to the electorate. Part III will 
analyze why these three reasons ultimately fail under Fifth 
Amendment Takings Clause scrutiny. 
In Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., Justice O’Connor highlighted 
the knowledge of the legislature argument by exhibiting the wariness 
courts have about imposing judicial review on legislative acts.102 In 
the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor stated “courts are not well 
suited” to “scrutinize” every “regulation of private property.”103 The 
majority opinion also opined that we should not allow “courts to 
substitute their predictive judgments for those of elected legislatures 
and expert agencies.”104 According to the majority, “[t]he reasons for 
deference to legislative judgments about the need for, and likely 
effectiveness of, regulatory actions are by now well established.”105 
Thus, it seems courts who apply the knowledge of the legislature 
approach start off in good company. 
The “general applicability” argument was endorsed by the 
Arizona Supreme Court in Home Builders Association of Central 
Arizona v. City of Scottsdale.106 In Home Builders, the court was asked 
to determine the validity of a water resources development fee, and 
whether the fee should implicate Nollan/Dolan review.107 Through a 
local study, the City of Scottsdale determined the current water 
resources available to the city were not enough to support new 
growth and development, and the city did not have the monetary 
resources to remedy the problem.108 The city decided to levy a hefty 
fee for development permits to raise the capital needed to alleviate 
the water problem.109 This approach was ultimately adopted by the 
local legislature.110 In dicta, the Arizona Supreme Court determined 
 
 102.  544 U.S. 528, 544 (2005). 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id.  
 105.  Id. at 545. In Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, Justice Mosk of the California Supreme 
Court shared similar thoughts regarding the knowledge of the legislator in a concurring 
opinion stating, “[i]t is the role of the legislative body, rather than the courts.” 911 P.2d 429, 
461 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring). See also Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of 
Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 (Ariz. 1997) (stating legislative acts “c[o]me to the court 
cloaked with a presumption of validity”). 
 106.  930 P.2d at 996. 
 107.  Id. at 994. 
 108.  Id. 
 109.  Id. at 995. 
 110.  Id.  
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the exaction fee did not warrant Nollan/Dolan review, distinguishing 
the case from Dolan based on the legislative/adjudicative 
distinction.111 The court stated that “[b]ecause the Scottsdale case 
involves a generally applicable legislative decision by the city, the 
court of appeals thought Dolan did not apply. We agree . . . .”112 
Closely tied to the reasoning that “generally applicable” exaction 
laws are beyond the courts’ purview and that courts should defer to 
the knowledge of the legislature, is the idea that courts should not 
re-write legislation from the bench. With many judges receiving 
lifetime appointments,113 accountability to the electorate is not 
readily apparent.114 The idea of laws being passed and enforced by an 
accountable government is seriously jeopardized if judges and 
justices only apply the parts of the law they find appealing.115 
In San Remo Hotel Limited Partnership v. City and County of San 
Francisco, the California Supreme Court gave credence to the 
“accountability” argument, noting, that if “[a] city council . . . 
charged extortionate fees for all property development . . . [that 
council] would likely face widespread and well-financed opposition 
at the next election.”116 But, unlike the supposed “city council” in 
San Remo, most judges and justices, at least those on the federal 
bench, do not face “well-financed opposition” threatening their jobs 
when they issue a ruling the electorate does not agree with. 
Notwithstanding this flaw in logic, the San Remo court alluded that 
voters themselves are best situated to fight against unwieldy 
“generally applicable” exactions. 
Underlying the reasoning behind all three justifications of the 
“formal” approach to the legislative/adjudicative distinction117 is 
the argument that the “heightened risk of [] ‘extortion[]’ . . . to 
 
 111.  Id. at 999–1000. 
 112.  Id. at 1000 (emphasis in original). 
 113.  Federal district court judges and federal appellate court justices all receive lifetime 
appointments during “good Behaviour.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
 114.  The argument for or against lifetime appointments for judges and justices is beyond 
the scope of this Note.  
 115.  However, the court system also plays an important role in ensuring that 
constitutional, statutory, and other rights are protected.  
 116.  41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002).  
 117.  Specifically: paying deference to the “knowledge of the legislature in determining 
legislation,” the “generally applicability” of the statute or regulation, and the “accountability 
to the electorate” arguments.  
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exact unconstitutional conditions is not present”118 when applying 
the formal approach. That is, “[t]he risk of [governmental] 
leveraging does not exist when the exaction is embodied in a 
generally applicable legislative decision.”119 Put simply, when the 
risk of government extortion is low, because the exaction is not 
being made on an ad hoc basis and therefore should apply equally 
to everyone, courts are reluctant to encroach upon the authority of 
the legislature.120 While there are some redeeming qualities to the 
formal approach, the weaknesses of this approach will be addressed 
in Part III.A. 
B. A Functional Approach to Exaction Law 
While some courts are concerned with the “source” of the 
exaction law,121 other courts are more concerned with the “nature” 
of the law itself. Courts adopting a “nature” of the law approach 
are said to follow a “functional” approach to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction.122 
The functional approach applies Nollan/Dolan review to both 
legislative and adjudicative decision-making bodies, focusing instead 
“on the character of the exaction and whether it applies broadly or 
conditions development of particular property.”123 Meaning that, 
practically speaking, functional courts are concerned with outcome, 
not process. 
Courts employing the functional approach also concern 
themselves with whether the character of the exaction is generally 
applicable.124 However, unlike the formal approach, legislative acts 
 
 118.  Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429, 444 (Cal. 1996). Extortion was a 
central concern in the Supreme Court’s rationale in Nollan. Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 
483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
 119.  Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 
(Ariz. 1997). See also San Remo, 41 P.3d at 105 (repeatedly stating that generally applicable 
laws are not subject to Nollan/Dolan review). 
 120.  See Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 696 (Colo. 2001) 
(distinguishing Nollan/Dolan on the grounds that the “risk of leveraging or extortion . . . is 
virtually nonexistent in a fee system”).  
 121.  Courts following this rationale are said to follow a “formal” framework for 
analyzing exactions. See supra Part II.A. 
 122.  Baker, supra note 97, at 178–80. See Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 756 
(Or. Ct. App. 2003).  
 123.  Baker, supra note 97, at 180. 
 124.  See generally Pensley, supra note 101, at 713–14.  
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are not presumed to be generally applicable. The Oregon Court of 
Appeals noted that “whether it is legislatively required or a case-
specific formulation[,] [t]he nature, not the source, of the 
imposition is what matters.”125 The broader the application (the 
nature of it), the more likely the act will escape Nollan/Dolan review. 
A main concern of functional courts is the degree of discretion 
the law allows the permitting authority.126 In Dudek v. Umatilla 
County, the Oregon Court of Appeals took exception with a 
seemingly legislative ordinance because of the degree of discretion it 
required on a case-by-case basis.127 The Dudek court held that 
because “there appears to be a risk of leveraging[,] . . . the ordinance 
at issue [] should be subject to the heightened takings clause 
standard articulated in Nollan and Dolan.”128 When there is little 
discretion offered to the permitting authority to make decisions on a 
case-by-case basis, a court applying the functional approach will 
typically find the legislative act beyond Nollan/Dolan review.129 If, 
however, the permitting authority has discretion on how to 
implement and execute the act based on an individualized 
application of the law to a specific parcel of land, the act is more 
likely to warrant Nollan/Dolan review. While functional courts do an 
admirable job at trying to target governmental extortion, like 
formalist courts, they also fail at fully protecting landowners’ and 
developers’ Fifth Amendment rights. 
 
 125.  J.C. Reeves Corp. v. Clackamas Cnty., 887 P.2d 360, 365, 365 n.1 (Or. Ct. App. 
1994) (“A condition on the development of particular property is not converted into 
something other than that by reason of legislation that requires it to be imposed.”).  
 126.  Dudek, 69 P.3d at 751 (applying Nollan/Dolan to an ordinance that was seemingly 
legislative, but allowed for a significant degree of discretion in application); see also Reznik, 
supra note 10, at 259 (recognizing “[i]n the exactions context, the functional approach blends 
together with the discretionary approach, which differentiates legislation from adjudication 
according to the amount of discretion possessed by the body applying the exaction”). 
 127.  Dudek, 69 P.3d at 756 (“Thus the determination of the applicability of this 
ordinance and, if applicable, the specific conditions that must be imposed under the 
ordinance, requires an assessment of the particular circumstances and an exercise of 
discretion by the county.”).  
 128.  Id. But see Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 698 (Colo. 2001) 
(holding Nollan/Dolan should not apply because the fee was based on legislation and was 
“generally applicable,” despite the fact the legislative exaction allowed individual discretion by 
the district manager). 
 129.  See Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 
(Ariz. 1997). 
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III. WHY THE CURRENT APPROACHES TO THE 
LEGISLATIVE/ADJUDICATIVE DISTINCTION FAIL 
Courts have failed to come up with a consistent framework to 
analyze when the Nollan/Dolan test should be utilized, especially 
when considering the legislative/adjudicative distinction. Many 
courts have chosen to follow a “formal” framework, focusing on the 
source of the ordinance. Other courts have chosen a “functional” 
approach, focusing instead on the outcome the ordinance produces. 
Over time, both approaches have proven problematic for courts to 
apply consistently.130 With differing opinions on when to even apply 
Nollan/Dolan, lower courts lack the guidance necessary to develop a 
clear exactions standard.131 
However, questioning whether there is a set standard for exactions 
analysis misses the point. The formal approach and the functional 
approach are inherently flawed because each approach allows private 
property to be in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Part will 
analyze how both the “formal” and the “functional” approaches fail to 
fully ensure takings protection in the exaction law context. 
Takings law protection is written directly into the Constitution. 
The Fifth Amendment guarantees private property shall not “be 
taken for public use, without just compensation.”132 As previously 
noted, the Supreme Court has stated that Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause protection is designed to “bar Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”133 Such 
protections are in place to guard against the inherent greedy nature 
of man. Government, it has been said, is “force,”134 and as such, 
 
 130.  See J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the “Essential Nexus”: How State and Federal 
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 373, 405–07 (2002) (“[T]he rule is extremely difficult to apply in the land use 
context.”); Pensley, supra note 101101, at 709–14 (stating “[t]he formal approach reaches 
inconsistent results,” while the functional approach remains “fuzzy” and “puzzl[ing]”); 
Reznik, supra note 10, at 247, 257–66 (“[T]he distinction is prohibitively difficult to make 
and is misplaced in the context of local government.”). 
 131.  See supra note 8. 
 132.  U.S. CONST. amend V. 
 133.  Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).  
 134.  George Washington is credited with this quote. However, it is unsure when, or if, 
he actually said it. See Eugene Volokh, “Government Is Not Reason, It Is Not Eloquence—It 
Is Force,” THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 14, 2010, 7:26 PM), 
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must be constrained. Thomas Jefferson addressed this topic when he 
wrote: “In questions of power, then let no more be heard of 
confidence in man, but bind him down from mischief by the chains 
of the Constitution.”135 It is the role of the judiciary to make sure 
constitutional rights are protected, even if the attack is coming from 
our elected representatives.136 
The “unconstitutional conditions doctrine” makes no distinction 
between laws or acts that are legislative and those that are 
adjudicative in nature.137 While the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine stands independent of the Takings Clause, exaction law 
provides a perfect scenario to analyze the application of the doctrine. 
Whether it is a local permitting agency or a state legislature 
demanding a landowner give up a constitutional right, the violation 
of a constitutional right is the same. 
A. Why the Formal Approach to Exaction Law Fails 
Taking the law at “face value” assumes that laws written by the 
legislature are always constitutional. And although courts are wary of 
finding laws unconstitutional, the fact remains that sometimes courts 
must make that determination. If a court is not willing to protect the 
rights of citizens against elected or appointed government officials, 
who will? As previously noted, exaction law differs from zoning 
law,138 so the issue is not whether the government can regulate land 
 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/14/government-is-not-reason-it-is-not-eloquence-it-
is-force/. 
 135.  Breemer, supra note 130, at 404 n.190 (citation omitted).  
 136.  See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 166,178 (“The judicial power of the 
United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution.”). 
 137.  Many federal unconstitutional condition cases deal with challenges to statutorily 
imposed conditions. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 203 (1991) (permitting Congress 
to condition health care funding on restrictions on speech encouraging abortion); Regan v. 
Taxation With Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550–51 (1983) (upholding the power 
of Congress to condition tax-exempt status for nonprofit groups upon their willingness to give 
up lobbying). And many federal unconstitutional condition cases have found legislation 
unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 
(1995) (striking down a federal statute banning certain federal employees from accepting 
compensation for making speeches or writing articles); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens 
for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272–77 (1991) (striking down a 
federal law conditioning disposal of federal property in a way that undermines executive branch 
power); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (holding 
Congress may not condition broadcasting grants on an agreement not to broadcast editorials). 
 138.  See supra Part I.A. Exactions are more closely tied to “spot zoning.” Needleman, 
supra note 25, at 1586 n.140. Spot zoning is a form of small scale zoning giving developers 
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use. Rather, the core exaction law issue is how the government can 
regulate land use under the purview of the Constitution. Other than 
the Nollan/Dolan test, which, as this Note has argued, is 
inconsistently applied, there is little other recourse for a landowner 
or developer threatened with an unconstitutional condition. While 
courts should respect the knowledge of the legislature when it comes 
to making policy decisions regarding land-use planning, courts must 
also stand ready to protect constitutional rights when they come 
under attack, even under the guise of policy. 
A key assumption made by courts who espouse the formalist 
approach is that the political process will protect the rights of all 
people.139 After all, a common response to complaints of a local 
government passing exaction laws that are extortionate in nature is 
vote ‘em out!140 This approach is flawed for many reasons. First, 
legislatures are able to pass laws targeting individuals, even if the law 
is described as “generally applicable.” For example, in the 
development permit context governments can gain specific benefits, 
like land or money from specific individuals, which the government 
could not otherwise gain without paying for them. If a legislature 
passes a law regarding development in a certain geographic area, but 
there is only one landowner or developer in that geographic area, the 
law will only affect one individual even though the law is “generally 
applicable” in nature. Because it is an individual landowner or 
developer who feels the burden of such an exaction, rather than 
society as a whole, it is unlikely this wrong will be worked out 
through the legislative process.141 The majority of people living in 
nearby areas will not mind gaining a windfall benefit (i.e., whatever 
the exaction is, such as a public access easement) at the expense of a 
landowner or developer they do not know. There may be instances 
where a well-financed group of developers can generate enough 
political muscle to affect an election, but on the whole, this type of 
political effort is unrealistic for most local developers. As California 
Supreme Court Justice Janice Rogers Brown pointed out in a 
dissenting opinion in San Remo: “[T]he majority’s exception for 
 
sweetheart deals by allowing them to build on, or otherwise use, land that would not be 
permitted for the proposed use under current zoning regulations. Id. Spot zoning presents the 
reverse issue of exactions, but the same need for stricter review. See id.  
 139.  See supra Part II.A and accompanying notes and text.  
 140.  See San Remo Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 87, 105 (Cal. 2002).  
 141.  See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1586. 
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legislatively created permit fees is mere sophism, particularly where 
the legislation affects a relatively powerless group and therefore the 
restraints inherent in the political process can hardly be said to have 
worked.”142 It is up to the courts to ensure the rights of “relatively 
powerless group[s]”143 are protected. 
Another major flaw with the formalist approach is the structure 
of local government.144 Local governments are not required to follow 
the separation of powers doctrine “requiring independent legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches with distinct roles.”145 For smaller 
local governments these roles will often “overlap,”146 with 
“[l]egislative bodies perform[ing] various administrative functions, 
and administrative bodies exhibit[ing] legislative qualities.”147 
Without proper separation of powers principles, the “cloak[ ] . . . of 
validity”148 often extended to legislative acts may feel more like a 
shroud of darkness.149 
In this same vein, another concern about giving judicial 
deference to local government is that “[a] small group of prominent 
local citizens may be single-handedly running the legislature.”150 This 
small group could enact laws that specifically target certain 
individuals, again under the pretext of general applicability. With 
little fear of recourse from the courts, and a successful political attack 
unlikely, local governments may be free to engage in the type of 
“extortion” that Justice Scalia addressed in the Nollan opinion.151 In 
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Limited Partnership, the 
 
 142.  San Remo, 41 P.3d at 124 (Brown, J., dissenting).  
 143.  Id. (Brown, J., dissenting). 
 144.  Reznik, supra note 10, at 257.  
 145.  Id. at 260. 
 146.  Pensley, supra note 101, at 709.  
 147.  Reznik, supra note 10, at 260.  
 148.  Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 (Ariz. 1997). 
 149.  Carol M. Rose, Planning and Dealing: Piecemeal Land Controls as a Problem of 
Local Legitimacy, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 837, 855–56 (1983) (“In a small-scale government . . . 
there may be no clash of multiple interests leading to at least temporary stasis and ultimately to 
an adequate and careful consideration of the public well-being. . . . [T]here may not be 
enough items of political interest to permit the development of coalitions and the benefit-
trading and mutual forbearance they entail. Thus, a local representative council cannot (or 
cannot always) be trusted to act with the ‘legislative due process’ envisioned by The Federalist 
No. 10 in a larger legislature.”) (footnotes omitted). 
 150.  See Needleman, supra note 25, at 1588–89. 
 151.  See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987). 
MESSERLY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
549 A Half-Baked Law 
 573 
Texas Supreme Court recognized the possibility of local government 
extortion as follows: 
While we recognize that an ad hoc decision is more likely to 
constitute a taking than general legislation, we think it entirely 
possible that the government could “gang up” on particular groups 
to force extractions that a majority of constituents would not only 
tolerate but applaud, so long as burdens they would otherwise bear 
were shifted to others.152 
Without the ability to seek redress from the courts, it is entirely 
plausible that landowners and developers could be forced into an 
unconstitutional conditions dilemma by local governments and 
permitting authorities. 
Closely tied to the structure of local government is how land-use 
regulations and ordinances, especially those passed by the legislature, 
are executed. Courts using a formal approach to determine whether 
the Nollan/Dolan test should apply, fail to acknowledge that many 
“legislative” acts are inherently “discretionary,”153 and therefore may 
not be applied in a generally applicable manner. Legal critics argue 
that “there is no logically consistent way to pinpoint the source of an 
exaction because [exactions] typically reach the landowner only after 
the involvement of both legislative and adjudicative bodies.”154 
Courts are not justified in applying judicial deference to legislative 
acts passing through adjudicative (i.e., discretionary) means in the 
exaction context precisely because in the application of the ordinance 
to the individual actor the risk for extortion is not diminished at all; 
rather, the risk of extortion is heightened in such a case.155 
Justice Souter identified this quandary in his Dolan dissent: 
“The majority characterizes this case as involving an ‘adjudicative 
decision’ to impose permit conditions, but the permit conditions 
were imposed pursuant to Tigard’s Community Development 
 
 152.  135 S.W.3d 620, 641 (Tex. 2004). 
 153.  Needleman, supra note 25, at 1588–89.  
 154.  Breemer, supra note 130, at 405.  
 155.  Judge Orme of the Utah Court of Appeals noted “‘local governments are not 
structured under strict separation of powers principles’ and ‘the nature of the land use 
decision-making process relies on flexibility and discretion.’” B.A.M. Dev., L.L.C. v. Salt Lake 
Cnty., 87 P.3d 710, 728 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (Orme, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) 
(citations omitted), rev’d in part, 128 P.3d 1161 (Utah 2006). 
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Code,”156 which was legislative in nature. The fact that some 
courts—those following a formal approach—do not take into 
account the amount of discretion offered by the legislative act to 
the permitting authority is troubling. How can we be assured our 
Fifth Amendment rights are protected if the legislative act is 
implemented in a discretionary manner?157 
Another reason to reject formal deference to legislative acts is 
that many of the acts allow “unelected adjudicative bodies . . . [to] 
negotiate development[al] exactions.”158 This is precisely what 
happened in Koontz. Florida law requires anyone developing on 
wetlands “to provide ‘reasonable assurance’ that proposed 
construction on wetlands is ‘not contrary to the public interest.’”159 
Consistent with this law, the District is allowed to require permit 
applicants to create, enhance, or preserve wetlands elsewhere.160 
Koontz’s initial offer of “foreclos[ing] any possible future 
development of the approximately 11-acre southern section of his 
land by deeding to the District a conservation easement on that 
portion of his property” was deemed inadequate by the District. 161 
At this point, the District began suggesting mitigation measures of 
their own.162 Allowing adjudicative bodies like the District in Koontz 
to negotiate with potential permit users does not suggest any sense 
 
 156.  Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 413 n* (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(citations omitted). The Development Code in question is considered legislative in nature.  
 157.  Some courts have applied the Nollan/Dolan test when the legislative act allows for 
discretionary implementation and other courts have not. Compare Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of 
Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (holding that even if the ordinance at 
issue was “legislative,” the dedication requirement “was clearly site-specific and adjudicative in 
nature”), and Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 641 
(Tex. 2004) (finding a category of exactions “based on general authority taking into account 
individual circumstances”) where the Nollan/Dolan test was applied, with Krupp v. 
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 694, 696 (Colo. 2001) (acknowledging the 
“legislative function . . . involves many questions of judgment and discretion,” but not holding 
the act to Nollan/Dolan review because it was a “legislatively based development fee”). The 
main concern, however, is not that some courts are willing to put legislative acts through 
Nollan/Dolan review, but rather, that there are “legislative acts” that do not function 
legislatively at all; hence the need for Nollan/Dolan review of all exactions. 
 158.  Pensley, supra note 101, at 710.  
 159.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2592 (2013) 
(quoting Henderson Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.414 (West 2012)) (citations omitted).  
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 2592–93. 
 162.  Id.  
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of general applicability within the law, even if the ordinance at issue 
was passed by an elected legislature. 
Legislative acts allowing permitting authorities and other 
adjudicative bodies to impose unconstitutional conditions do not 
deserve judicial deference. The threat of government extortion is in 
no way relieved because the legislature approves the act. If Koontz 
had been more eager to have the development permit, he might have 
caved to the District’s unconstitutional wishes without putting up a 
legal fight. Logic dictates, and the Fifth Amendment proscribes, that 
“a municipality should not be able to insulate itself from a [Takings 
Clause] challenge merely by utilizing a different bureaucratic vehicle 
when expropriating its citizen’s property.”163 
B. Why the Functional Approach to Exaction Law Fails 
As described above in Part II.B, some courts approach exaction 
law using a functional and pragmatic approach. If the ordinance or 
legislative act is imposed generally and there is little discretion 
exercised by the permitting authority, the law is presumed 
constitutional and beyond Nollan/Dolan review. The problems with 
this approach are inherent in the difficulty of application. How broad 
must the law be to be considered “generally applicable”? How much 
“discretion” is too much discretion? Often these two questions 
blend together, and because the functional approach struggles with 
answering these types of questions legal critics have dubbed the 
functional approach “fuzzy,”164 meaning that it often leads to 
inconsistent results. 
In Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation District, developers sought 
Nollan/Dolan review of a decision made by the Breckenridge 
Sanitation District (“Breckenridge”) regarding a development fee.165 
The issue in Krupp was whether Breckenridge could apply a higher 
fee to a “triplex” housing unit as opposed to a “duplex” unit of 
roughly the same size, even though the legislation did not take into 
account “a conversion category for triplexes.”166 Noting that 
Breckenridge had “the powers necessary to implement state and 
 
 163.  Amoco Oil Co. v. Vill. of Schaumburg, 661 N.E.2d 380, 390 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995). 
 164.  Pensley, supra note 101, at 713. 
 165.  19 P.3d 687, 692 (Colo. 2001).  
 166.  Id. at 691. 
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federal regulations,”167 the Colorado Supreme Court allowed the 
development fee to stand without Nollan/Dolan review because the 
fee was a “generally applicable, legislatively based development 
fee.”168 Although the Krupp court recognized “the setting of rates 
and fees . . . involves many questions of judgment and discretion,”169 
and the “District Manager is authorized to assign [fees] to 
triplexes,”170 because the fee was authorized by the legislature, and 
the discretion used to determine the fee was guided by legislative 
direction, the court would “not set aside the methodology”171 used 
to determine the fee or bring it under Nollan/Dolan review. 
By contrast, in Dudek, the Oregon Court of Appeals applied 
Nollan/Dolan review to a legislative ordinance because “the practical 
reality is that application of this ordinance to a particular case 
requires a significant exercise of discretion.”172 In determining each 
case, the local municipality had to assess “whether the land division 
‘will serve four or more lots and will likely serve additional parcels 
due to development pressures in the area, or likely be an extension of 
a future road as specified in a future road plan[.]’”173 Because this 
process was not “mechanical,” and there appeared to be a “risk of 
leveraging or singling out”174 applicants, the ordinance was brought 
under Nollan/Dolan review.175 
These two cases highlight a general weakness in the functional 
approach. Each court considered the “discretion” given to the local 
authority by the legislative act—seemingly very similar discretion—
and each court came to a different conclusion. Although the facts 
and schemes in each case were different, the general weakness of 
where to draw the line is apparent. As with any legal bright line, it is 
difficult for courts to determine when the amount of discretion 
offered in a legislative act is too much discretion. 
And while line drawing is a glaring weakness, it is not the main 
problem with the functional approach. The main problem with the 
 
 167.  Id. at 690. 
 168.  Id. at 696. 
 169.  Id. at 694. 
 170.  Id. at 691. 
 171.  Id. at 694.  
 172.  Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751, 756 (Or. Ct. App. 2003).  
 173.  Id. (emphasis omitted) (citation omitted). 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id.  
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functional approach is it also allows a taking to occur, so long as the 
ordinance allowing the exaction is not too discretionary. In the 
exactions context, as opposed to zoning or taxes, whether the 
ordinance is discretionary should not matter.176 Just because the 
legislature gives a district manager authority to take land, that does 
not make the taking constitutional. 
C. “General Applicability” is Not a Reason to Deny Fifth 
Amendment Protection 
A common argument among courts denying Nollan/Dolan 
review to legislative acts is that “[t]he risk of [governmental] 
leveraging does not exist when the exaction is embodied in a 
generally applicable legislative decision.”177 This sort of reasoning 
begs the question: Does the Fifth Amendment allow private property 
to be taken for public use so long as the vehicle used to do so is 
“generally applicable” to other property owners as well? The answer 
is no. The text of the Fifth Amendment makes no exceptions for laws 
that are “generally applicable” to all landowners. 
In a dissent from the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari in 
Parking Association of Georgia, Inc. v. City of Atlanta, Justice 
Thomas eloquently captured the absurdity of the “generally 
applicable” argument as follows: 
It is not clear why the existence of a taking should turn on the type 
of governmental entity responsible for the taking. A city council 
can take property just as well as a planning commission can. 
Moreover, the general applicability of the ordinance should not be 
relevant in a takings analysis. If Atlanta had seized several hundred 
homes in order to build a freeway, there would be no doubt that 
Atlanta had taken property. The distinction between sweeping 
legislative takings and particularized administrative takings appears 
to be a distinction without a constitutional difference.178 
 
 176.  Another criticism of the functional approach includes the ability of exactions to 
“morph simply when the number of applicants increases or decreases.” Pensley, supra note 
101, at 713. Also, focusing on discretion “provides no solution because most local land use 
decisions, including exactions, must be tailored to fit an individual development at some 
point.” Breemer, supra note 130, at 406.  
 177.  Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 1000 
(Ariz. 1997). 
 178.  515 U.S. 1116, 1117–18 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
MESSERLY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2015 
578 
Because the legislative/adjudicative distinction is a “distinction 
without a constitutional difference,”179 and because it has proven 
problematic to apply, it would behoove the Court to strike the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction altogether. Applying Nollan/Dolan 
review to all exactions will still protect legitimate government interests 
without unduly burdening landowners and developers. 
While there may be good arguments for laws of “general 
applicability” in some contexts, exaction law is not one of them.180 
Every time a law is passed that affects an interest in real property, 
regardless of whether it is generally applicable, the Fifth Amendment 
is implicated to some degree. Given that protecting property owners 
from shouldering an unfair burden of public use is written in the 
Constitution, landowner protection should be a high priority for our 
nation’s courts. Just because multiple landowners may have their 
land taken by the same ordinance does not make the ordinance 
effectuating the taking constitutional. 
IV. AFTER KOONTZ: APPLYING NOLLAN/DOLAN REVIEW TO 
ALL EXACTIONS IS THE BEST ANSWER FOR FIFTH 
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Koontz has generally been 
considered a win for property owners’ rights.181 By eliminating any 
distinction between whether the permit is “approve[d] . . . on the 
condition that the applicant turn over property[,] or denie[d] . . . 
because the applicant refuses to do so,” the Court has ensured that 
governments cannot evade the unconstitutional conditions doctrine 
“simply by phrasing [the] demands for property” in a favorable 
light.182 This holding bolsters Fifth Amendment protection by 
allowing landowners and developers an opportunity to negotiate on 
more just terms.183 Also, by holding that monetary exactions “must 
 
 179.  Id. at 1118. 
 180.  Zoning classifications may be an example of a generally applicable property law that 
is not subject to Nollan/Dolan review. Typically, however, zoning limits the use of land; it does 
not “take” it for public use. For a discussion on the differences between exactions and zoning, 
see Part I.A supra.  
 181.  See discussion supra note 1.  
 182.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2595 (2013).  
 183.  In Justice Kagan’s dissent, she pointed out this holding may have unintended 
consequences because determining when negotiations stop and demands start can be a slippery 
proposition. Id. at 2610 (Kagan, J., dissenting). 
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satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan 
and Dolan,”184 the Court bolstered Fifth Amendment protection by 
ensuring that the exaction is not the money equivalent of an 
easement or other taking the government has no right to take 
without paying the property owner just compensation. 
But even with the holdings in Koontz, Fifth Amendment protection 
from government extortion is still missing a key ingredient. The 
question of whether judicial deference should be given to legislative acts 
in the permitting and exaction contexts is still alive.185 This Part will 
analyze how the Court’s recent monetary exactions holding in Koontz 
relates to the legislative/adjudicative distinction, and ultimately why the 
distinction is no longer needed. First, monetary exactions and their 
relation to legislative acts will be analyzed. Next, the failures of the 
formal and functional approaches, in light of the Koontz holding, will be 
discussed. Finally, this Part will evaluate the general applicability 
argument, specifically in relation to taxes. 
By holding monetary exactions subject to Nollan/Dolan review, 
the Court concomitantly dealt a glancing blow to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction. Monetary exactions are 
repeatedly a focal point in exactions law litigation, and a dispositive 
factor is often whether the exaction is based on general legislation or 
an ad-hoc adjudicative decision.186 Calling into question the 
“cloak[]”187 of presumed legitimacy for monetary exactions 
simultaneously raises a question about which type of judicial 
deference, if any, should be allotted to other legislative acts in the 
permitting and exaction contexts. And, without “say[ing] more”188 
about the scope of the new rule regarding monetary exactions, lower 
courts will quickly find tension between applying Nollan/Dolan 
review to monetary exactions and paying judicial deference to 
 
 184.  Id. at 2599. 
 185.  In the Koontz dissent, Justice Kagan pointed out that this distinction is untouched 
by the majority opinion and therefore still relevant, even in light of the Court’s two holdings. 
Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
 186.  See e.g., Rogers Mach., Inc. v. Wash. Cnty., 45 P.3d 966, 977 (Or. Ct. App. 2002) 
(holding the traffic impact fee in question was not subject to Nollan/Dolan review because the 
fee was not adjudicative in nature).  
 187.  Home Builders Ass’n of Cent. Ariz. v. City of Scottsdale, 930 P.2d 993, 996 (Ariz. 1997). 
 188.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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legislative acts of general applicability—many of which are monetary 
in nature.189 
The failures of the formal approach to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction are also highlighted in Koontz, 
namely the tension between the monetary exaction holding in the 
case and the policy of judicial deference to legislative ordinances 
often applied by the courts. Although the monetary exaction in 
Koontz was not specifically designated from a legislative act, 
monetary exactions oftentimes are derived from specific legislative 
guidance. The fact the Court is willing to bring all monetary 
exactions under Nollan/Dolan review is precisely why the Court 
should have extended the ruling to all exactions, regardless of their 
source. While the Koontz holding seriously dents the judicial 
deference argument, it leaves enough ambiguity to keep the lower 
courts in limbo. 
If the Court had extended the holding to all legislative exactions, 
it would have created a constitutionally sanctioned standard for all 
lower courts to start their analysis. Such a holding would also create 
clear guidance for local governments to follow when implementing 
developmental mitigation ordinances. Such a holding would also 
assure landowners and developers that if they felt their Fifth 
Amendment right to just compensation was being violated they 
could turn to the courts for relief, as opposed to a political process 
that may be inefficient.190 
Extending the Koontz holding to include all legislative acts still 
allows local governments to have developers internalize the negative 
externalities associated with the sought-after development; indeed, 
that is precisely what Nollan and Dolan aim to achieve. And at the 
same time, landowners’ and developers’ Fifth Amendment property 
rights are more fully protected by not allowing governments to 
legislate exaction benefits they otherwise could not receive. 
 
 189. For a nonexhaustive list of cases discussing monetary extraction issues, see Home 
Builders Ass’n, 930 P.2d at 993; San Remo Hotel Ltd. P’ship v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 41 P.3d 
87 (Cal. 2002); Ehrlich v. City of Culver City, 911 P.2d 429 (Cal. 1996); Krupp v. 
Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687 (Colo. 2001); Home Builders Ass’n of Dayton v. 
City of Beavercreek, 729 N.E.2d 349 (Ohio 2000); Dudek v. Umatilla Cnty., 69 P.3d 751 
(Or. Ct. App. 2003); Rogers, 45 P.3d 966 (Or. Ct. App. 2002); Town of Flower Mound v. 
Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620 (Tex. 2004). 
 190.  As it stands now, in situations qualifying for Nollan/Dolan review the judicial 
system is a source of relief, but by no means is Nollan/Dolan review guaranteed in all 
exaction contexts.  
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Applying the Nollan/Dolan test to all exactions, regardless of the 
source, also alleviates the problems with the functional approach. 
Specifically, line-drawing questions about how much discretion is too 
much discretion are gone. While the holding in Koontz may not have 
addressed the issue of discretion specifically, other recent lower court 
cases highlight why the functional approach fails. 
Courts following the functional approach to the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction are practically applying the 
Nollan/Dolan standard already, specifically regarding the Dolan 
“rough proportionality” test. For example, in Rogers Machinery Inc. 
v. Washington County, a land developer petitioned for a writ of 
review to challenge a county ordinance that assessed a traffic impact 
fee to fund improvements to city streets.191 The Oregon Court of 
Appeals held Nollan/Dolan review did not apply, finding the traffic 
impact fee had “a hybrid quality” to it, both acting like a fee 
(adjudicative) and a tax (legislative).192 The fee was to be assessed 
after classifying the type of development from a large list, a list the 
court determined was “very comprehensive.”193 Then, based on the 
proposed usage, a set of legislative calculations generated the fee 
amount that could be charged for the particular development.194 
Because different land uses and classifications “vary in the burden 
they place on [the] street,”195 the fee would be adjusted based on 
those differences. 
By the time the Rogers court had gone through the process of 
determining whether: (1) the ordinance in question was 
discretionary, and if so, how discretionary; (2) the ordinance applied 
broadly or narrowly; and (3) to apply the Nollan/Dolan test or not, 
it could have just applied the Nollan/Dolan test and been done with 
it. The standard under Dolan does not require precise mathematical 
calculations when determining if the proposed exaction demonstrates 
rough proportionality to the anticipated harm caused by the 
development. It can be argued that the process the legislature went 
through in Rogers to come up with the list of possible classifications, 
and the guidelines for the calculation of the fee, was individualized 
 
 191.  45 P.3d at 967. 
 192.  Id. at 972.  
 193.  Id. at 980–81.  
 194.  Id. at 981.  
 195.  Id.  
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enough to satisfy Dolan,196 assuming the fee was then roughly 
proportional.197 
Another example is found in Krupp. In Krupp, developers 
sought Nollan/Dolan review of a decision made by the Breckenridge 
Sanitation District regarding a development fee.198 In calculating the 
fee to be imposed, Breckenridge “first calculat[es] the project’s peak 
effluent flow.”199 Breckenridge then uses the “specific”200 assessment 
in determining the impact the development will have on the local 
infrastructure.201 Breckenridge even went so far as to commission an 
independent expert to evaluate the system of calculating the fees 
based on the proposed development.202 Although the Colorado 
Supreme Court eventually decided that the Nollan/Dolan test did 
not apply, the legwork for a Nollan/Dolan analysis was already 
complete. It would have been just as easy for the Krupp court to 
determine that Nollan/Dolan did apply, and that the standard was 
met,203 as opposed to going through the analysis of determining 
whether to apply Nollan/Dolan review at all. 
While it is certainly possible that not all local governments 
conduct the detailed analysis the governments did in Rogers and 
Krupp, these cases show that it is not too much to ask for local 
governments to conduct some sort of detailed analysis pertaining to 
the exaction ordinance at issue, and by so doing, comply with the 
Dolan test. These cases also show the amount of analysis performed 
by the courts will not increase by applying Nollan/Dolan review to 
all exactions. 
As discussed in Part III.C of this Note, the general applicability 
argument in favor of deference to legislative acts is hollow in the 
exaction law context. Why allow a constitutional right, specified in 
 
 196.  In Town of Flower Mound, the Texas Supreme Court noted the Dolan standard 
needed to be “measure[d] . . . in a meaningful, though not precisely mathematical, way.” 
Town of Flower Mound v. Stafford Estates Ltd. P’ship, 135 S.W.3d 620, 644 (Tex. 2004).  
 197.  The Rogers court did not hold the traffic impact fee assessment met the Dolan 
standard; rather, the Rogers court held Dolan did not apply at all. Rogers, 45 P.3d at 983. 
 198.  Krupp v. Breckenridge Sanitation Dist., 19 P.3d 687, 689 (Colo. 2001). 
 199.  Id. at 691.  
 200.  Id. at 694. 
 201.  Id.  
 202.  Id. Interestingly, the independent expert actually advised the Breckenridge 
Sanitation District to raise their fees. Id. at 692.  
 203.  In fact, the trial court that first heard the Krupp case determined that if 
Nollan/Dolan review were applicable, “[Breckenridge] satisfied the test because the [fee] is 
roughly proportional to the impact of the project on the [local] facilities.” Id.  
MESSERLY.FINV2 (DO NOT DELETE) 11/23/2015  3:53 PM 
549 A Half-Baked Law 
 583 
the Fifth Amendment, to be taken away by elected officials? If 
Koontz had not decided to appeal the Florida Supreme Court’s 
decision, his rights under the Fifth Amendment would have been 
violated. The Nollan/Dolan test does not preclude the government 
from getting the land or other benefit it seeks, it simply ensures the 
government does not take the land without just compensation.204 
While the application of reviewing all exactions under the 
Nollan/Dolan framework seems straightforward and efficient, there 
is one area of the law that remains unsettled: taxes. 
In Koontz, the Court downplayed the significance of the 
monetary exactions holding regarding taxes. After acknowledging 
the dissent’s argument that, based on the Court’s holding, “there 
will be no principled way of distinguishing impermissible land-use 
exactions from property taxes,” the Koontz Court stated that “[w]e 
think [the dissent] exaggerate[s] both the extent to which that 
problem is unique to the land-use permitting context and the 
practical difficulty of distinguishing between the power to tax and 
the power to take by eminent domain.”205 The Koontz Court also 
noted that “[i]t is beyond dispute that ‘[t]axes and user fees . . . are 
not takings,’”206 but that taxes and user fees may constitute a taking 
if not obtained through proper taxing channels.207 Without 
elaborating further on the taxing issue,208 the Koontz Court 
concluded by stating that “the power of taxation should not be 
confused with the power of eminent domain,” and that “we have 
had little trouble distinguishing between the two.”209 Because only 
certain entities have the power to tax, and because the Court has 
long held that “property the government could constitutionally 
demand through its taxing power can also be taken by eminent 
 
 204.  Interestingly, if both conditions of the Nollan/Dolan test are met, the government 
actually receives the benefit it seeks, paying nothing for it because no taking is found.  
 205.  Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2600 (2013).  
 206.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 207.  Id. 
 208.  Id. at 2602 (speaking of taxes, the Koontz Court stated “[t]his case does not 
require us to say more.”).  
 209.  Id. (citation omitted). A further analysis of the similarities and differences between 
takings and taxes is beyond the scope of this Note. See Eric Kades, Drawing the Line between 
Taxes and Takings: The Continuous Burdens Principle, and Its Broader Application, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 189 (2002), for a more detailed analysis. 
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domain,”210 the monetary exactions holding in Koontz will not work 
a revolution if extended to all legislative acts, taxes included. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Koontz holding clarifies a great deal of confusion regarding 
exaction law. However, by refusing to “say more”211 about when the 
Nollan/Dolan test should apply, the Supreme Court has left out a key 
ingredient of Fifth Amendment protection. The Koontz Court should 
have extended the holding that monetary exactions are subject to 
Nollan/Dolan review to all exactions, irrespective of their source or 
the nature of their imposition. Since both legislative and adjudicative 
exactions can violate the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, and 
since the Fifth Amendment makes no qualifications regarding 
legislative or adjudicative acts, it makes little sense to evaluate 
exactions under different sets of rules. By eliminating the 
legislative/adjudicative distinction altogether and holding that all 
exactions, regardless of where they come from, are subject to 
Nollan/Dolan review, the Supreme Court can add the key ingredient 
that is missing from full Fifth Amendment Takings Clause protection. 
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 210.  Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2601. If local governments want to take money through 
taxation, then they should take money through taxation, not through developmental 
permitting authorities.  
 211.  Id. at 2608 (Kagan, J., dissenting).  
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